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ROSALIE E. WAHL AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
INCLUSIVITY
Hon. Harriet Lansing'
Rosalie Wahl's history as the first woman justice on the
Minnesota Supreme Court visibly established her as a major
force for change in one notably and needlessly underinclusive
area. But viewing her in that context alone consigns her
professional career to too narrow a scope and overlooks other
major achievements.
Rosalie's early work in the State Public Defenders's Office
demonstrated her ever present commitment to provide access to
the legal system despite the problems of economic exclusion.
Her work on the Racial Bias Task Force, following her work on
the Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, was a
testimonial to her lifelong effort for racial inclusivity. That same
spirit was revealed in her efforts to include the Minnesota
Constitution as a full partner with the U.S. Constitution in
Minnesota decision making. These efforts surfaced with her
1986 dissent in State v. Murphy,' and came to fruition in her
work on the majority in State v. Hershberger, and as the author
of State v. Russell 3
Two other facets of her spirit of inclusivity are more subtle.
I would identify them as life and landscape. Rosalie's law school
education (and mine) was obtained during the years of the
highly vaunted "reasonable man standard." As far as we could
tell, the words meant what they said and extended some distance
beyond tort liability. We noted right off the absence of reason-
able women from the equation, but lately I've been wondering
whether we might not have overlooked something in the initially
acceptable category of "reasonable." As it evolves in legal
opinions, this "reason" can be confined to very narrow catego-
ries bereft of human qualities, or it can be used to disguise a
t Judge, Minnesota Court of Appeals.
1. 380 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 1986).
2. 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
3. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
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received (and maybe only arguably reasonable) set of social
assumptions. Rosalie's opinions, in both her use of language
and her analyses, often demonstrate a wider definition of reason
that does not artificially omit or ostracize the effect of human
emotions on perception and thought. She brings in the
emotions to better focus the picture and, when relevant,
incorporates them into the decision. In her dissent in State ex
rel. Beaulieu v. Mounds View,4 she recognized the influence of the
unconscious on individual and collective behavior. In Pikula v.
Pikula,5 addressing custody decisions, she emphasized the value
of emotional connections forged by primary caretakers. When
Rosalie talks about the moral and social values sprouted at the
hearth, you quickly conclude that she did not develop that list
by reason alone.
Rosalie's inclusivity of landscape is one of the enduring
delights of her opinions. Her descriptions and metaphors of the
heartland are great sources of strength. Whether it is layering
sod along a culvert in Kliniski v. SouthdaLe Manor, Inc.,6 or
observing a dew-laden bulldozer in Anderson v. American Casualty
Co.,' or listening to the rattle of old rain gutters beside a
chicken coop in State v. Anderson,8 you can see the meadow
stretching beyond. But my personal favorite is her evocation in
In re Want of a substantial evidence standard as "evidence with
heft." I can see the threshers in the field and taste the lemon
meringue pie for lunch. Rosalie's work in the judiciary has left
indelible "evidence of heft," and as a judge and as a citizen, I
am grateful.
I think that Rosalie was not so much called to the law as the
law was called to Rosalie. Called to account. And if that loving
and painstaking calling to account does not continue to produce
a fairer, truer, wiser, and wholer justice system, it will not be
because Rosalie Wahl did not do everything in her power to
bring it about.
4. 518 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1994).
5. 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985).
6. 518 N.W.2d 7 (Minn. 1994).
7. 504 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 1993).
8. 379 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. 1985).
9. 441 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1989).
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